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THE BEDERMAN LECTURE ON LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 
 
PUBLIC LAW AND CUSTOM 
David J. Bederman* 
Law professors love puzzles. Give us a legal doctrine that does not make 
sense, or appears counterintuitive, or does not appear to comport with some 
methodological assumption, and we can spend months (if not years) plumbing 
its depths and producing reams of paper in exploring its contours. The good 
news today is that my exegesis shall be limited to the length of this lecture. Let 
me first set out the character of the puzzle and see if I cannot solve it in the 
time allotted. 
I. THE PUZZLE 
Today’s puzzle can be simply stated: can public law rules be made or 
modified by custom? 
At the outset, let us define some terms. By “custom,” I mean legal rules 
which are “unofficial” and “unenacted” inasmuch as they do not receive their 
sanction from a statute adopted by a duly constituted legislature or from a 
decision handed down by a judge of a court of competent jurisdiction. Custom 
is simply the practices and usages of distinctive communities. One peculiarity 
of the modern law school curriculum is that we do not give much reflection to 
the sources of law in contemporary legal culture, and law students reflexively 
assume that all law must be derived from a legislature passing statutes or 
judges deciding cases. In short, we implicitly train law students from virtually 
their very first day of studies that law is a top-down social construct, consistent 
with John Austin’s vision of authoritative commands.1 Custom, by contrast, is 
 
 * K.H. Gyr Professor in Private International Law, Emory University. This text is adapted from the 
author’s lecture on the same subject, held on September 26, 2011, as the inaugural Bederman Lecture on Law 
and Jurisprudence. The author thanks all those whose generous support made this ongoing lecture series 
possible (along with a traveling fellowship for Emory Law students to attend the Hague Academy of 
International Law). The material presented in this lecture is drawn from the author’s Custom as a Source of 
Law. 
 1 See 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 536 (Robert Campbell ed., London, John Murray 
5th ed. 1885); JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 30, 163–64 (Isaiah Berlin et al. 
eds., Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1954) (1832). 
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a bottom-up dynamic, where legal rules are being made by the actual 
participants in the relevant legal community. 
“Public law” is the domain of legal relations dictated by the state. It stands 
in contrast with what we call “private law,” the ordering of affairs between 
individuals in contract, tort, and property—the bedrock of the first-year law 
school curriculum. The core of public law is often viewed as administrative, 
criminal, and constitutional law. But the boundaries between public and private 
law are increasingly being blurred. As the terms of more and more private 
relations are being dictated by government action—say, a statute that imposes 
a limit on how much interest can be charged on a loan or a regulatory scheme 
that governs communications between banks and individual credit-card 
holders—the domain of purely private law may be shrinking. I doubt that 
proposition, but that is an issue for another day—and another lecture. In any 
event, public law norms are those sets of rules at the heart of any polity. And 
while not all public law norms are “rule[s] of recognition,” in the sense that the 
eminent legal scholar H.L.A. Hart employed,2 the dictates of public law would 
seem to have a higher stature—or, at a minimum, a different character—than 
those of private law relationships between individuals. 
Many prominent legal theorists have asserted that even if custom should be 
recognized as a source of legal obligation, there are limits to its domain, and 
one of these is that customary norms cannot remake public law. James 
Coolidge Carter3 and T.F.T. Plucknett4 both contended that custom cannot 
change public law. Plucknett’s assertion was made as part of his great survey 
of the English common law; Carter’s discussion was in relation to what he 
viewed as an ideal legal system. So, the notion that custom can have no effect 
on public law rules has been stated as both a matter of description in legal 
history and a preferred norm in the design of legal systems. There are many 
skeptics of custom as a source of law. Within this group, most are adamant that 
public law is just too important to be influenced by customary lawmaking 
processes. 
Both the descriptive and normative claims of those that would refute a role 
for custom in public law are quite wrong, and the goal of this lecture is to tell 
you why and how. Indeed, I will accomplish this jurisprudential feat without 
 
 2 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100–10 (2d ed. 1994). 
 3 See JAMES COOLIDGE CARTER, LAW: ITS ORIGIN GROWTH AND FUNCTION 120–21 (1907). 
 4 See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 307–13 (Little, Brown & 
Co. 5th ed. 1956) (1929). 
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reference at all to the role of custom in public international law—that set of 
norms governing behavior between actors in the international community. And 
while it might be strange for an academic whose primary area of study is 
international law to preclude examples from his chosen field, for the purposes 
of today’s lecture, I am content with confining my proofs to examples drawn 
from domestic law. Indeed, to use international law to make my case that 
custom can create public law is a bit like shooting fish in a barrel. Legal 
lectures ought to have some creative tension; there should be some uncertainty 
as to whether the speaker can really be held to his proofs and make his case. 
Doubt me, and let me persuade you. 
Public law rules have historically been made and modified by custom. This 
is nothing new. But, just as significantly, I would argue here that significant 
advantages accrue for those legal systems that allow public law norms to 
mutate in response to the needs of their polities, irrespective of the 
constitutional or administrative impediments to their creation. In other words, 
bottom-up lawmaking for public norms—based on the consistent experience 
and acquiescence of participants in that legal system—is an appropriate 
mechanism for change. To explore these propositions, I will look at doctrinal 
examples drawn from sources as varied as the common law of property in 
Oregon, family law in South Africa, and separation-of-powers principles in 
United States constitutional law. 
II. OREGON, BEACH ACCESS, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS 
In the United States, there is a constitutionally entrenched guarantee to 
property rights.5 A key question for “takings” jurisprudence—a public law 
doctrine rooted in our constitutional law—is whether an essential property 
right has been confiscated by the government or regulated in such a way as to 
deny the property owner all use of his property. As the U.S. Supreme Court 
observed in the 1992 landmark decision of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Council: 
Where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of 
all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation 
only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s 
estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title 
 
 5 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation.”). 
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to begin with. . . . [A state] must identify background principles of 
nuisance and property law that prohibit the [landowner’s] uses . . . .6 
So here we have the nub of the problem: does a public easement, created by 
custom of (assumptively) long-standing character, but only first recognized by 
a court much more recently, become part of the state’s “background principles 
of . . . property law”? If the custom has merged with those principles, a 
property owner never had the right to build on her land in a way that interfered 
with the public’s rights. In short, the state took nothing when it regulated 
consistent with the custom. But if the custom only adheres at the time it is first 
positively recognized in the public law—through a judicial precedent or 
statute—then the owner’s right to build had vested, and she should be entitled 
to just compensation if the state purports to later bar improvement of her 
property. 
Courts in Oregon have radically transformed the English common law 
doctrine of local custom in property. That doctrine, as best exemplified in 
William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, allowed for the 
imposition of an inchoate servitude on land within a particular locality upon 
proof of an exacting set of conditions.7 This customary servitude was 
announced for the first time in Oregon law in the 1969 decision of State ex rel. 
Thornton v. Hay.8 The Oregon Supreme Court, in delocalizing customary 
easements and applying them to all beaches in the state, was obliged to 
reformulate Blackstone’s doctrinal elements, particularly to overcome the 
limiting factors of antiquity, certainty, and reasonableness.9 That court offered 
this paean to custom: 
 
 6 505 U.S. 1003, 1027, 1031 (1992). I should disclose that I served as counsel to David Lucas in the 
Supreme Court, as well as to Jeanette Stevens in the Cannon Beach case, discussed below. See infra notes 13–
23 and accompanying text. 
 7 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *74–78. 
 8 462 P.2d 671, 676 (Or. 1969) (“Because many elements of prescription are present in this case, the 
state has relied upon the doctrine in support of the decree below. We believe, however, that there is a better 
legal basis for affirming the decree. The most cogent basis for the decision in this case is the English doctrine 
of custom. Strictly construed, prescription applies only to the specific tract of land before the court, and 
doubtful prescription cases could fill the courts for years with tract-by-tract litigation. An established custom, 
on the other hand, can be proven with reference to a larger region. Ocean-front lands from the northern to the 
southern border of the state ought to be treated uniformly.”). 
 9 See id. at 678 n.6 (“The English law on customary rights grew up in a small island nation at a time 
when most inhabitants lived and died without traveling more than a day’s walk from their birthplace. Most of 
the customary rights recorded in English cases are local in scope. The English had many cultural and language 
groups which eventually merged into a nation. After these groups developed their own unique customs, the 
unified nation recognized some of them as law. Some American scholars, looking at the vast geography of this 
continent and the freshness of its civilization, have concluded that there is no need to look to English 
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Because so much of our law is the product of legislation, we 
sometimes lose sight of the importance of custom as a source of law 
in our society. It seems particularly appropriate in the case at bar to 
look to an ancient and accepted custom in this state as the source of a 
rule of law. The rule in this case, based upon custom, is salutary in 
confirming a public right, and at the same time it takes from no man 
anything which he has had a legitimate reason to regard as 
exclusively his.10 
It was inevitable that Oregon’s custom of public beach access would be 
challenged as an unconstitutional “judicial taking,” an unexpected 
pronouncement of a rule of property law that had been hitherto unknown in the 
jurisdiction.11 Oregon courts deflected that assertion. In McDonald v. 
Halvorson, the Oregon Court of Appeals considered such an argument and 
simply ruled: 
In Thornton, the Supreme Court merely confirmed the public’s right 
of use in the “dry-sand area” of Oregon’s beach land, which the 
public has always assumed to be a part of the public beach. Although 
the “dry-sand area” belongs to the property owners, it has always 
been subject to the public’s recreational easement. . . . 
. . . State law is the source of the sticks that constitute a property 
owner’s bundle of rights. . . . Thus, the court in Thornton merely 
declared a right of use which the public always had . . . . Defendants 
have no protected property interest in the public’s easement over the 
“dry-sand area,” and therefore there can be no “taking.”12 
In subsequent cases, culminating in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach,13 this 
logic was repeated: Thornton merely declared a preexisting custom, there was 
no change in Oregon property law, and no taking was effected. Thornton was 
only “an expression of state law that the purportedly taken property interest 
 
customary rights as a source of legal rights in this country. Some of the generalizations drawn by the text 
writers from English cases would tend to limit customary rights to specific usages in English towns and 
villages. But it does not follow that a custom, established in fact, cannot have regional application and be 
enjoyed by a larger public than the inhabitants of a single village.” (citations omitted)). 
 10 Id. at 678. 
 11 For more on the notion of judicial takings, see Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. 
REV. 1449 (1990). For U.S. Supreme Court cases considering the issue, see Stop the Beach Renourishment, 
Inc. v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010); Hughes v. Washington, 389 
U.S. 290, 296–98 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring); and Muhlker v. New York & Harlem R.R., 197 U.S. 544 
(1905). 
 12 760 P.2d 263, 268–70 (Or. Ct. App. 1988) (footnote omitted), rev’d in banc on other grounds, 780 
P.2d 714 (Or. 1989). 
 13 835 P.2d 940 (Or. Ct. App. 1992), aff’d in banc, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1207 
(1994). 
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was not part of plaintiffs’ estate to begin with. Accordingly, there was no 
taking within the meaning of the Oregon or United States Constitutions.”14 
The Oregon Supreme Court put an even finer point on this rejection of 
judicial takings in Stevens. It did not matter, the court said, that the landowners 
had acquired their property before the decision in Thornton was handed down; 
“[r]ather, the question is when, under Thornton’s reasoning, the public rights 
came into being. The answer is that they came into being long before plaintiffs 
acquired any interests in their land.”15 The Oregon Supreme Court then used 
the language of the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Lucas and noted that 
“Thornton merely enunciated one of Oregon’s ‘background principles 
of . . . the law of property.’”16 The custom declared in Thornton was not, 
according to the Stevens court, an unconstitutional judicial taking because the 
custom was not, again in the words of Lucas, “newly legislated or decreed,” 
but rather “inhere[d] in the title itself, in the restrictions that background 
principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already placed upon land 
ownership.”17 
Despite the takings concerns implicated in the Oregon Supreme Court’s 
decision, the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Stevens case.18 
Justice Scalia (joined by Justice O’Connor) penned a vigorous dissent from the 
denial of review, concluding that “[t]o say that this case raises a serious Fifth 
Amendment takings issue is an understatement.”19 Justice Scalia began his 
analysis with a review of Oregon custom jurisprudence after Thornton and was 
forced to conclude that Oregon’s “new-found ‘doctrine of custom’ is a 
fiction.”20 “[T]he Supreme Court of Oregon’s vacillations on the scope of the 
doctrine of custom,” he wrote, “reinforce a sense that the court is creating the 
doctrine rather than describing it.”21 The dissent noted: 
 
 14 Id. at 942. 
 15 Stevens, 854 P.2d at 452 n.9. 
 16 Id. at 456 (alteration in original) (quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992)). 
 17 Id. (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029) (internal quotation marks omitted). For more on Stevens’s 
possible impact on Lucas, see Melody F. Havey, Note, Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach: Does Oregon’s 
Doctrine of Custom Find a Way Around Lucas?, 1 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 109, 121 (1994); and Peter C. 
Meier, Note, Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach: Taking Takings into the Post-Lucas Era, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
413 (1995). 
 18 Stevens, 510 U.S. 1207. 
 19 Id. at 1212 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 20 Id. at 1208–10, 1213. 
 21 Id. at 1212 n.4. 
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[J]ust as a State may not deny rights protected under the Federal 
Constitution through pretextual procedural rulings, neither may it do 
so by invoking nonexistent rules of state substantive law. Our opinion 
in Lucas . . . would be a nullity if anything that a state court chooses 
to denominate “background law”—regardless of whether it is really 
such—could eliminate property rights.22 
Justices Scalia and O’Connor would have had the Court grant review to 
consider whether Oregon—under the guise of recognizing a private law 
property doctrine—had effectuated a deprivation of property.23 But, make no 
mistake, Oregon courts had clearly allowed a customary regime (the rights of 
an inchoate public to beach access) to modify a public law rule (the 
constitutionally entrenched rights of property owners to exclude others from 
their land). 
There seems to be no doubt that customary claims to public rights will 
increase in the coming years, especially as governments discover the benefits 
of the approach. Nor are there likely to be many avenues of redress. Even 
though a plurality of Justices on the U.S. Supreme Court, as recently as 2010, 
appeared to endorse the doctrine of judicial takings—allowing courts to 
examine whether judge-made changes to property law could so fundamentally 
unsettle expectations as to constitute a taking of property in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment24—this means of constitutional review remains speculative. 
And although the Stop the Beach Renourishment decision did not address 
custom and public rights in property, the issue will certainly arise again in 
jurisdictions other than Oregon and in contexts other than beach access.25 
Custom is a cheap and easy solution to the nagging problem of public rights in 
 
 22 Id. at 1211 (citation omitted). 
 23 See id. at 1214 (“Particularly in light of the utter absence of record support for the crucial factual 
determinations in that case, whether the Oregon Supreme Court chooses to treat it as having established a 
‘custom’ applicable to Cannon Beach alone, or one applicable to all ‘dry-sand’ beach in the State, petitioners 
must be afforded an opportunity to make out their constitutional claim by demonstrating that the asserted 
custom is pretextual. If we were to find for petitioners on this point, we would not only set right a procedural 
injustice, but would hasten the clarification of Oregon substantive law that casts a shifting shadow upon 
federal constitutional rights the length of the State.”); see also Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark: 
Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L. REV. 91, 
140 n.225 (1995). 
 24 Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601–02 (2010) 
(plurality opinion). 
 25 See Gregory M. Duhl, Property and Custom: Allocating Space in Public Places, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 
199, 239–41 (2006); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986). 
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private property. Custom is ancient. Custom extols community. Custom makes 
us feel good. What could possibly be wrong with a doctrine like this? 
Custom’s bright and cheery demeanor has been forcefully espoused by 
many legal writers as “support[ing] government regulations restricting” 
property rights and advancing communal interests in property.26 And one 
would have to be a bit of a boor not to feel some favor for a doctrine that 
allows the rustic villagers to dance around the maypole on the manor lawn,27 
permits hardy fishermen to dry their nets on the shore as they have from time 
immemorial,28 and, yes, gives you and your loved one the right to take a 
midnight stroll on a windswept beach. All this, one might suppose, is precisely 
the evil of custom. Custom can be a blunt instrument against the property 
rights of the minority—a sharp sanction against economic holdouts and 
political dissidents. 
III.  SOUTH AFRICAN FAMILY LAW 
Oregon’s experience with custom and public law illustrates one possible 
dynamic: a customary norm is being used to advance a public good, even in the 
face of a possible constitutional objection. Another vector for the penetration 
of custom into a public law system is exemplified by South Africa’s 
experience. South Africa is a legal system where determinations of status 
(especially family status) combine both public and private law elements. South 
African law is strongly pluralistic, drawing strength and sustenance not only 
from civil law sources and traditions29 but also from indigenous customary 
regimes which exerted a profound influence on family and property law as 
well as local governance. 
During the colonial and apartheid periods of South Africa, custom was a 
matter of fact to be proven, unless it was so notorious as to be subject to 
judicial notice.30 By statute today in South Africa, a customary norm is subject 
to judicial notice provided that “such law can be ascertained readily and with 
 
 26 Hope M. Babcock, Has the U.S. Supreme Court Finally Drained the Swamp of Takings 
Jurisprudence?: The Impact of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council on Wetlands and Coastal Barrier 
Beaches, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 30–31 (1995). 
 27 See Hall v. Nottingham, [1875] 1 Exch. Div. 1 (Eng.); Abbot v. Weekly, (1665) 83 Eng. Rep. 357 
(K.B.); 1 Lev. 176. 
 28 See Mercer v. Denne, [1904] 2 Ch. 534 (Eng.), aff’d, [1905] 2 Ch. 538 (Eng.). 
 29 South Africa was, like other British colonies (including Sri Lanka and Québec), formerly French or 
Dutch, and thus governed by civil law. 
 30 See TW BENNETT, CUSTOMARY LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA 48–49 (2004). 
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sufficient certainty.”31 Absent that, the custom may be proven by the parties to 
a case by competent evidence.32 Post-colonial courts have been broadly 
eclectic in their selection of evidence for proof of custom, relying on sources 
as varied as those provided by ethnographers, local elders, chiefs, or other 
assessors, or the testimony of the parties themselves.33 
Assuming a custom could be proved, what happened in the case of a 
conflict with a public law norm? In British colonial practice, customs at 
variance with English common law were permissible but would be stricken if 
deemed to be contrary to natural justice, equity, good conscience, or public 
policy.34 Despite this wide formulation, only those “customs as inherently 
impress[ed a court] with some abhorrence or [we]re obviously immoral in their 
incidence” were struck as repugnant.35 In apartheid South Africa, at least, 
customary law was declared repugnant in only a handful of cases.36 Today in 
South Africa, repugnancy has been statutorily narrowed to situations where 
“indigenous law [is] opposed to the principles of public policy and natural 
justice.”37 The repugnancy doctrine has thus remained a check on what a polity 
might regard as atavistic customs, although increasingly such determinations 
will be made in the context of entrenched or constitutional values. 
Aside from the constitutional transformation of customary family law, the 
other way that custom can be altered is more straightforward: through 
legislative codification or judicial pronouncement. In most of the pluralistic 
legal systems of Africa and the Pacific that have recognized custom as a source 
of law, statutes are increasingly being employed to codify the substantive 
norms of customary family law or, at a minimum, to establish the boundaries 
and limits of its recognition.38 During the British colonial period, it was 
understood that the act of codification transmuted a body of living custom into 
 
 31 Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 § 1(1) (S. Afr.). 
 32 See id. § 1(2); BENNETT, supra note 30, at 44–48; Jill Zimmerman, The Reconstitution of Customary 
Law in South Africa: Method and Discourse, 17 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 197, 214 & n.92 (2001). 
 33 See A.N. Allott, The Judicial Ascertainment of Customary Law in British Africa, 20 MOD. L. REV. 
244, 246–52 (1957). 
 34 See ANTONY ALLOTT, NEW ESSAYS IN AFRICAN LAW 158–71 (1970); TW BENNETT, HUMAN RIGHTS 
AND AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW UNDER THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSTITUTION 19 (1995). 
 35 See Chiduku v. Chidano, 1922 SRLR 55, 58 (S. Rhodesia). 
 36 See BENNETT, supra note 30, at 68 & nn.246–49 (citing cases dealing with customs allowing marriage 
without consent and succession by illegitimate children, among others). 
 37 Law of Evidence Amendment Act § 1(1). 
 38 See Native Marriages Act 23 of 1950 (S. Rhodesia); John Y. Luluaki, Customary Marriage Laws in 
the Commonwealth: A Comparison Between Papua New Guinea and Anglophonic Africa, 11 INT’L J.L. POL’Y 
& FAM. 1, 10 & 33 n.12 (1997). 
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an “official” code, very much the same way that a bug is frozen in time in a 
block of amber.39 
In some jurisdictions, this process of codification was fairly limited. In 
South Africa, especially under the white apartheid regime, the codification 
dynamic was anything but benign. The 1927 Black Administration Act was an 
early lynchpin of the apartheid legal structure because it created a separate 
justice system to administer customary law among the black population of the 
country.40 Under this statute, a broad body of case law was developed by 
native commissioners (overseen by a Native Appeal Court) that, over time, 
managed to create an official body of customary family law.41 If that was not 
enough, South African regimes sanctioned the promulgation of codes for Natal 
and Zululand, as part of the infamous homeland or Bantustan initiatives, and 
these enactments covered family law norms in the form of a restatement.42 
Today, this edifice of “official” customary law has been partially 
demolished by the 1998 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act (RCMA), 
which repealed the Black Administration Act and the Natal Code of Zulu 
Law.43 The RCMA has substantive provisions on the formalities, requirements, 
and consequences of customary marriages,44 as well as a grant to the South 
African Minister of Justice of the power to issue further regulations,45 but it 
does not purport to articulate every aspect of the customary laws of marriage in 
the country. 
In African customary family law, a traditional aspect of marriage has been 
the payment of brideprice—the transfer by the groom (or his family) to the 
wife’s family of an amount of wealth (usually livestock) reflecting the 
reproductive capacity of the woman over her lifetime.46 For some scholars, 
brideprice really reflects the value of male children to be born to a marriage 
and represents an interfamilial transfer of wealth. In South Africa, the marriage 
practice of brideprice (there known as lobolo, rovoro, or bogadi) has been 
 
 39 See T. OLAWALE ELIAS, THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 207–11 (1956). 
 40 Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 § 11(1) (S. Afr.) (repealed 1986). 
 41 See BENNETT, supra note 30, at 41–42, 141–47. 
 42 See id. at 46–49, 70–74. 
 43 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 § 13 & sched. (S. Afr.). 
 44 See id. §§ 3–10. 
 45 See id. § 11. 
 46 See BENNETT, supra note 30, at 220–24; John Comaroff, Introduction to THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE 
PAYMENTS 1, 36–37 (J.L. Comaroff ed., 1980); A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, Introduction to AFRICAN SYSTEMS OF 
KINSHIP AND MARRIAGE 1, 46 (A.R. Radcliffe-Brown & Daryll Forde eds., 1950). 
BEDERMAN GALLEYS4 7/31/2012 11:07 AM 
2012] PUBLIC LAW AND CUSTOM 959 
recognized in the RCMA as a nonrepugnant custom.47 Where marriages are 
contracted only upon partial payment of brideprice (with the rest to be paid 
over time), South African courts have enforced those subsequent payments by 
effectuating customary remedies of dissolution of the marriage or the forced 
return of the wife and her children.48 Even though South Africa’s RCMA does 
not expressly make the payment of brideprice an element of a valid customary 
marriage, refunds of lobolo are often the most contentious issue in customary 
divorces. The amount of a refund will often depend on the number of children 
produced from the marriage (i.e., the more procreation, the less the refund) and 
the conduct of the parties in the marriage (i.e., the less creditable the conduct 
of the wife, the greater the refund).49 
Closely allied with the institution of brideprice is the nature of family 
property in African customary law. In South Africa, customary rules of family 
and house property have been reformed by the 1998 RCMA. Under that 
statute, the default regime for all future customary monogamous marriages is 
that marital estates are in community of property for purposes of profit and 
loss.50 Prospective spouses may contract around the community property 
default by prenuptial agreements,51 but the RCMA was recognized as a major 
reform because it placed wives in a position of equality with husbands as to 
property rights in marriage. 
Indeed, the primary motivating force for reform of customary marriages in 
Africa has been the perception that traditional institutions discriminate against 
women in all stages of their lives (whether as girls about to enter into 
matrimony, as wives managing within a family property regime, or as widows 
after the loss of a husband). While brideprice institutions have generally 
evaded challenge under the new constitutional or human rights standards of 
gender equality (despite the appearance that women are commodified by such 
payments52), restrictive rules of family property and primogeniture have not.53 
In South Africa, however, constitutional values of gender equality have 
prevailed over any ostensible rights claimed under customary law. The South 
 
 47 See Recognition of Customary Marriages Act §§ 2–3. 
 48 See BENNETT, supra note 30, at 232–33. 
 49 See id. at 277–78. 
 50 See Recognition of Customary Marriages Act § 7(2). 
 51 Id. 
 52 See BENNETT, supra note 30, at 235. 
 53 See, e.g., Bangindawo v. Head of the Nyanda Regional Authority 1998 (3) SA 262 (Tk) (S. Afr.). 
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Africa Constitution of 1996 enshrined a right to culture,54 which has been 
generally construed to extend to claims existing under customary law.55 Such 
rights, according to the constitution, “may not be exercised in a manner 
inconsistent with any [other] provision of the Bill of Rights.”56 As has been 
noted by the South Africa Constitutional Court, “[C]ustomary law should be 
accommodated, not merely tolerated, as part of South African law, provided 
the particular rules or provisions are not in conflict with the Constitution.”57 
After some fits and starts,58 South African courts have limited the application 
of customary family law regimes where they clearly infringed on the equality 
rights of women, whether under the constitution or by statute.59 In Bhe v. 
Magistrate, Khayelitsha, the Constitutional Court struck down the Native 
Administration Act inasmuch as it countenanced a custom by which a deceased 
man’s estate (having no male issue) devolved to his father or nearest male 
relative, and not his spouse or daughters.60 The court found that the 
primogeniture custom—with the concomitant obligation upon a male heir to 
support the decedent’s wife (or wives) and daughter(s)—was being 
undermined by modern living conditions in South Africa, especially the trend 
toward urbanization and nuclear families.61 
Although not directly implicated in the Bhe case, the thorniest issue of 
customary family law was nevertheless present. Polygyny—and the analogous 
institution of concubinage—is a consistent feature of most customary family 
law regimes in Africa and the Pacific Basin. In southern African custom, the 
legal effect of polygynous marriages was to create distinct household units 
 
 54 See S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 31(1) (“Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community 
may not be denied the right, with other members of that community to enjoy their culture . . . .”). 
 55 See BENNETT, supra note 30, at 78, 86–90. See generally S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 15(3)(a) (allowing 
“legislation recognising . . . systems of personal and family law under any tradition”). 
 56 S. AFR. CONST., 1996 § 31(2). By way of contrast, the Constitution of Zimbabwe inverted these 
constitutional values: the customary law of succession prevailed over gender equality. ZIM. CONST., 1981 
§ 23(3)(b); see also Magaya v. Magaya 1999 (1) ZLR 100 (S) at 109 (Zim.). 
 57 Bhe v. Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) at 604 para. 41 (S. Afr.). 
 58 In Mthembu v. Letsela 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA) (S. Afr.), the South Africa Supreme Court of Appeal 
avoided a constitutional challenge to a custom in which property of a decedent with no male children reverted 
back to the decedent’s father, leaving the wife and female children with nothing. The court concluded that 
there had been no valid customary marriage and that any proposed reforms of the custom were best 
accomplished by the legislature or Law Commission. Id. at 883 para. 40; accord Jelili A. Omotola, 
Primogeniture and Illegitimacy in African Customary Law: The Battle for Survival of Culture, 15 IND. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 115 (2004); Zimmerman, supra note 32, at 226. 
 59 See Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 pmbl., 
§§ 1(xxviii)(b)(ii), 3(2)(b), 8(d) (S. Afr.) (including customary practices as within the scope of the Act). 
 60 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 61 See id. at 618–19 paras. 80, 82. 
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(“houses”) within a larger family.62 A husband was obliged to treat all his 
spouses with equal respect due their rank (based on the seniority of the 
marriage).63 In contemporary South Africa, polygyny remains a robust 
institution, especially with male migrant workers having, simultaneously, rural 
and urban spouses.64 
After a great deal of debate by South Africa’s Law Commission, polygyny 
was recommended as not being an atavistic custom that should be abrogated by 
statute.65 The 1998 RCMA accepted this position by statutorily recognizing 
preexisting polygynous marriages under customary law66 and by permitting 
subsequent polygynous marriages, provided they comply with the terms of the 
Act.67 The most important of these conditions was that, if a husband wished 
after his first marriage to contract subsequent marriages, it required a court 
order approving a marital property system for all the wives and houses 
involved.68 Such an order must take into account the circumstances of all the 
family groups affected by the new marriage and ensure an equitable 
distribution of the estate.69 If such cannot be safeguarded, the court can refuse 
to allow the subsequent marriage.70 The RCMA does not, however, provide 
whether a polygynous marriage concluded in contravention of its terms is void 
ab initio or merely voidable.71 In subsequent debates in the Law Commission 
and South African Civil Society, strong arguments have been advanced that 
polygynous marriages may, in certain circumstances, benefit rural women, so 
long as their property rights (in the event of divorce or the spouse’s death) are 
safeguarded.72 
 
 62 See BENNETT, supra note 30, at 243. 
 63 See id. at 243–45. 
 64 See Tracy E. Higgins et al., Gender Equality and Customary Marriage: Bargaining in the Shadow of 
Post-Apartheid Legal Pluralism, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1653, 1684–91 (2007) (collecting extensive 
empirical data on polygyny in South Africa). 
 65 See BENNETT, supra note 30, at 246–47. 
 66 See Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 § 2(3) (S. Afr.). Interestingly, South African 
law does not sanction polygynous marriages under Islamic law, although equal succession rights for wives in 
such marriages are recognized. See Hassam v. Jacobs 2009 (5) SA 572 (CC) (S. Afr.). 
 67 See Recognition of Customary Marriages Act § 2(4). 
 68 Id. § 7(6). 
 69 Id. § 7(7)(a)(ii)–(iii). 
 70 Id. § 7(7)(b)(iii). 
 71 See BENNETT, supra note 30, at 247–48. 
 72 See S. AFRICAN LAW COMM’N, THE HARMONISATION OF THE COMMON LAW AND THE INDIGENOUS 
LAW: REPORT ON CUSTOMARY MARRIAGES ch. 6 (1998); Penelope E. Andrews, “Big Love”? The Recognition 
of Customary Marriages in South Africa, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1483 (2007). 
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In South Africa, we have the full range of contemporary legal responses to 
traditional custom: accommodation and transformation, codification and 
precedent. Far from withering away, customary family law regimes and 
institutions appear to be thriving in a handful of pluralistic legal cultures where 
they were acquiesced in during the colonial period and not suppressed in an 
urge toward legal modernization. In societies as diverse as Nigeria, South 
Africa, Papua New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands, customary law will 
remain an essential source for substantive rules of marriage, divorce, child 
custody, succession, and traditional governance. Custom has resisted what 
would otherwise be strong impulses toward codification and harmonization of 
essential rules of family status, relationships, and transactions. So even in a 
legal domain as freighted with public law (and even constitutional) dimensions 
as family law, in those cultures where customary regimes have taken root, they 
are likely to flourish. 
IV.  U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND SEPARATION-OF-POWERS 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Constitutional law is the most public of domestic public law topics. Indeed, 
the entire notion of a polity’s fundamental law would seem to be the ultimate 
exemplar of a legal domain that should, in the construct of writers such as 
James Coolidge Carter, H.L.A. Hart, and T.F.T. Plucknett, be utterly immune 
from customary influences. Inasmuch as constitutions are a lex scriptum, 
custom should, under this theory, play no role in their construction, 
application, or interpretation. Yet, even in this most public of legal arenas, 
customary regimes can survive and flourish. Any explanation for this 
ostensible paradox must account not only for the historic origins of custom and 
the common law but also for the continued relevance of the practices of 
political branches in the resolution of structural or institutional disputes within 
domestic polities. Constitutional custom is not only a historical construct, it is 
a phenomenon associated with the common law of government officerial 
prerogatives, as well as a pragmatic approach to the resolution of separation-
of-powers disputes. 
Can the actual practices of governmental branches be reliable evidence for 
resolution of separation-of-powers controversies? In other words, can a 
governmental practice—one “deeply embedded in the history and tradition of 
th[e] country”73—legitimize that usage as constitutional? It appears from the 
 
 73 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786 (1983). 
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U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that evidence of the “practical 
exposition”74 or “practical construction”75 of powers granted under the 
Constitution by the respective branches can be dispositive of separation-of-
powers disputes. 
Indeed, as early as 1803, in Stuart v. Laird, the Supreme Court indicated: 
Another reason [suggested] for reversal is, that the judges of the 
supreme court have no right to sit as circuit judges, not being 
appointed as such, or in other words, that they ought to have distinct 
commissions for that purpose. To this objection, which is of recent 
date, it is sufficient to observe, that practice and acquiescence under 
it for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of 
the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed 
fixed the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most 
forcible nature. This practical exposition is too strong and obstinate 
to be shaken or controlled. Of course, the question is at rest, and 
ought not now to be disturbed.76 
This language has been revisited by later Supreme Courts in a variety of 
separation-of-powers contexts77 and has been recognized by a number of 
commentators.78 While the idea of “practical construction” of the 
Constitution’s separation-of-powers provisions would seem most often to 
implicate the balance of authority between the political branches (Congress 
and the Executive), that is not invariably so. Stuart, after all, involved the 
power of Supreme Court Justices to “ride circuit” and sit on lower courts 
created by Congress.79 
At the outset, it is important, though, to distinguish the various techniques 
for employing custom in constitutional interpretation. One of these is to use 
evidence of the “practical construction” of a constitutional provision by the 
political branches from the early years of the Republic (before 1820) as a 
 
 74 Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803). 
 75 Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 306 (1901). 
 76 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 309. 
 77 See, e.g., The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 688–90 (1929); United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 
U.S. 459, 473 (1915). 
 78 See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 
B.U. L. REV. 109, 115 (1984); Jason T. Burnette, Note, Eyes on Their Own Paper: Practical Construction in 
Constitutional Interpretation, 39 GA. L. REV. 1065 (2005). 
 79 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 303–06; cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 400–01 (1989) (addressing 
the constitutionality of service by federal judges on the U.S. Sentencing Commission and providing post-
Founding-period examples of extrajudicial service). 
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proxy for the views of the Founders in constitutional interpretation.80 This is 
just another form of originalism—the school of constitutional interpretation 
that seeks to recapture the understandings of the Constitution’s drafters and 
ratifiers and so to anchor the application of those provisions. When used in this 
way, constitutional customary norms are not based on usage and practice at 
all—they are merely an embodiment of original understanding. If 
constitutional custom has any real meaning, though, it must be extrinsic to the 
constitutional text and to any original understandings as to the meaning of that 
text. 
There are a number of canonical decisions where the Supreme Court has 
ruled that Congress has progressively acquiesced in the President’s acquisition 
of power. These are especially evident in the foreign relations field81 but have 
also been significant in the realm of the President’s authority to remove 
officials he has appointed—a question finally settled in the Supreme Court’s 
1926 Myers v. United States decision.82 But, quite curiously, the customary 
crank for separation of powers may ratchet in only one direction. The Supreme 
Court has, on no less than two occasions, struck down well-documented 
“practical constructions” of constitutional provisions running in favor of 
congressional power as being contrary to express textual commands. 
In Fairbank v. United States, the Court ruled unconstitutional a statute 
authorizing a stamp tax on exports as violative of the textual prohibition on 
such duties, even though there was evidence (dating from the First Congress) 
that such imposts were permissible.83 In response, the Court held that the 
practical construction of a constitutional provision by legislative action is 
entitled to no force except in cases of doubt, and in that case, there was none.84 
This was exactly the tack taken by the Court in 1983, in INS v. Chadha, of 
striking down the practice of “legislative vetoes.”85 These were statutory 
 
 80 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 200–02 (2003) (reviewing early congressional action with 
respect to copyrights to determine the meaning of the constitutional grant of power); Printz v. United States, 
521 U.S. 898, 905–07 (1997) (examining early congressional statutes as to limits on the power to commandeer 
state officials); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 136 (1926) (exploring whether Congress can block the 
removal from office of presidential appointees). 
 81 See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415–16 (2003) (settlement agreement); Dames 
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678–84 (1981) (same); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 
304, 324 (1936) (imposition of embargoes). 
 82 See 272 U.S. at 150, 170–71 (citing historical precedents for unilateral presidential removal). 
 83 181 U.S. 283, 306–07, 312 (1901). 
 84 Id. at 308, 311–12; accord Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517, 525 (1940) (“Even 
constitutional power, when the text is doubtful, may be established by usage.”). 
 85 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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provisions that granted power to the Executive Branch to carry out certain 
actions with the proviso that both congressional houses (or even just one) 
could cancel that action.86 This ostensibly violated the Constitution’s 
Presentment Clause,87 which requires that every congressional action having 
the force of law be presented to the President for his approval or veto.88 
Despite a long history of legislative vetoes as part of the accommodation by 
Congress with the regulatory state created by the New Deal,89 the Court 
adhered to a formalistic notion of separation of powers and struck down such 
provisions.90 
In a separation-of-powers dispute, how does a party prove a binding 
constitutional custom? The Supreme Court has recognized two broad 
components. The first element is the objective extent, duration, and 
consistency of the practice.91 Tracing the historical pedigree of a usage back to 
the founding of the Republic seems to be irrelevant unless the constitutional 
custom is being used as a surrogate for a showing of the Framers’ original 
intent. That a practice can be dated to the early Republic is obviously helpful, 
as in Dames & Moore, where at issue was the President’s power to conclude 
settlement agreements with other nations, and a prime exhibit was President 
Washington doing just that in 1799.92 But a consistent practice over a shorter 
duration is also fine.93 Otherwise, showing “[s]cores and hundreds” of 
iterations of the practice will do.94 Conversely, failing to prove even a 
threshold level of occurrence for a practice will usually be fatal to a 
constitutional custom claim,95 as will a finding that the practice was isolated.96 
 
 86 Id. at 925. 
 87 Id. at 956–59. 
 88 U.S. CONST. art I, § 7, cl. 2–3. 
 89 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 942 n.13 (noting that presidents have signed bills containing such legislative 
vetoes, even as they protested their constitutionality); id. at 967–74 (White, J., dissenting) (narrating the 
history of nearly two hundred statutes containing legislative-veto provisions). 
 90 Id. at 959 (majority opinion). 
 91 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(holding that a constitutional customary norm must be “systematic, unbroken, . . . [and] long pursued”). 
 92 453 U.S. 654, 679 n.8 (1981). 
 93 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 322–28 (1936) (giving additional 
weight to a practice of over 140 years); Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 118–19 (1925) (noting that eighty-
five years of presidents pardoning criminal contempts “strongly sustains the construction [the practice] is 
based on”); The Laura, 114 U.S. 411, 414–17 (1885) (determining that acquiescence to pardons of lesser 
executive officials for nearly a century “fixed the construction”). 
 94 United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 469 (1915); accord Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 8–9 
(1965) (affirming the Secretary of State’s authority to impose area restrictions on travel with passports). 
 95 See, e.g., Springer v. Gov’t of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 205 (1928) (rejecting an assertion 
as being based on a “limited number” of incidents). 
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Even if the objective element of constitutional custom can be overcome, 
something more is required. Although it would be a mistake to think that this 
extra ingredient is opinio juris—in the sense of requiring a governmental entity 
to accept a practice as law97—the subjective element in U.S. constitutional law 
boils down to whether the opposing branch in the separation-of-powers 
struggle has actually accepted or acquiesced in the practice.98 Or, as Justice 
Frankfurter put the matter in his Youngstown concurrence, the executive 
practice must be “long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never 
before questioned.”99 The problem, though, is how to interpret what may be a 
branch’s silence, for in situations where it is Congress extending its power by 
statute, an executive branch response may be indeterminate (as with signing a 
bill but still asserting its unconstitutionality). Likewise, when it is the 
presidency that seeks to expand its power, short of a statute resisting such an 
assertion (overriding a veto),100 Congress may have little scope for positive 
action, and its objection to the practice may be ambiguous.101 
For these reasons, the Supreme Court has appeared to require that the 
branch making the assertion of authority do so in the form of an act that places 
the coordinate branch on notice of its position and requires a response.102 
Effective notice of the practice is thus essential.103 When an objection is 
forthcoming from the opposing branch, its effect may still be uncertain. In 
Chadha, the fact that eleven of thirteen presidents from Woodrow Wilson to 
Ronald Reagan objected to the legislative veto seemed to be decisive for the 
 
 96 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 170–71 (1926). 
 97 See Helen Silving, “Customary Law”: Continuity in Municipal and International Law, 31 IOWA L. 
REV. 614, 622–23 (1946). 
 98 See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (“[P]ractice and acquiescence under it for a 
period of several years . . . affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction.”). 
 99 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 100 This occurred with the enactment of the War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 
(1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2006)). 
 101 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 669 (1981) (noting that support for, or objection to, 
executive action may range from “explicit congressional authorization to explicit congressional prohibition”); 
see also Glennon, supra note 78, at 139–41. 
 102 See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 315–16 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
Executive Branch must have actually exercised discretion, not merely have possessed it, for there to be 
congressional acquiescence); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 124–25 (1958) (rejecting an executive branch 
assertion of a customary practice because it was stated as a mere policy). 
 103 See, e.g., Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686 (“Past practice does not, by itself, create power, but ‘long-
continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a presumption that the [action] had 
been [taken] in pursuance of its consent . . . .’” (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil 
Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915))); Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 475, 481 (determining that Congress’s silence in the 
face of ninety-two orders for withdrawals of public lands amounted to acquiescence). 
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Court.104 Yet, in Haig v. Agee, that Congress had declined the Executive 
Branch’s earlier request to authorize it to revoke passports on national security 
grounds did not apparently matter.105 The President’s authority in that respect 
was upheld by the Court (although perhaps premised on the President’s 
independent foreign relations powers).106 
Whether the acquiescence requirement for a binding constitutional custom 
unduly favors the presidency in its separation-of-powers struggles with 
Congress remains hotly contested.107 It is evident that Congress can impliedly 
ratify presidential assertions, and such will be “[c]rucial” in any separation-of-
powers calculus.108 This will especially be so in the realm of the President’s 
war powers109 and treaty authority.110 Yet, despite the pervasive role of 
constitutional custom in separation-of-powers controversies, potent critiques 
remain. Aside from concerns about the acquiescence requirement’s modalities 
for congressional responses to executive power,111 there is a philosophical 
concern that this doctrine embeds some form of “Burkean minimalism” into 
separation-of-powers discourse,112 a path dependence leading us down a road 
to constitutional infidelity and perdition. Yet, we need not fear to trod this 
path. If anything, courts have been more likely—as seen in Chadha—to heed 
Justice Frankfurter’s warnings that practice “cannot supplant” a clear 
constitutional requirement113 and that “[i]llegality cannot attain legitimacy 
 
 104 462 U.S. 919, 942 n.13 (1983). 
 105 453 U.S. at 317 n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 106 See id. at 307–10 (majority opinion). 
 107 See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 45, 61–
74 (1993); Jane E. Stromseth, Understanding Constitutional War Powers Today: Why Methodology Matters, 
106 YALE L.J. 845, 872–86 (1996) (reviewing LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER (1995)); Matthew 
Baker, Comment, The Sound of Congressional Silence: Judicial Distortion of the Legislative–Executive 
Balance of Power, 2009 BYU L. REV. 225, 231–43. 
 108 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 680. 
 109 See Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713, 733–35 (2008); Stromseth, 
supra note 107, at 882–86. 
 110 See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (leaving open the question of the President’s power to 
unilaterally terminate treaties which had earlier received advice and consent by the Senate). 
 111 See Glennon, supra note 78, at 140–42; Stromseth, supra note 107, at 881 & n.187; Michael J. 
Glennon, Constitutional Custom Reconsidered: Historical Practice and the President’s War Powers 3–5 (Oct. 
8, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. cfm?abstract_id=1930352. 
 112 See Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 375 (2006); Note, Congressional 
Restrictions on the President’s Appointment Power and the Role of Longstanding Practice in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1914, 1929–31 (2007). 
 113 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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through practice.”114 Or, as the patristic writers of the canon law tradition 
observed, “Custom without truth is only error grown old.”115 
V. THE PUZZLE SOLVED 
These three examples of custom in public law were chosen with great care 
for this lecture. Each confirms that the usages and practices of communities 
(whether it is the beach-going public in Oregon, tribal or clan groups in South 
Africa, or the coordinate branches of the U.S. federal government) can make a 
custom in the face of substantial public law restraints. In the instances of 
property rights in Oregon and separation-of-powers disputes, the constraint is 
nothing less than the United States Constitution itself, whether in its structural 
aspects or its rights-granting features. In South Africa, we have an additional 
statutory overlay, what with a partial codification of custom in the RCMA and 
the tension inherent with the dual command of the South African Constitution 
to promote both customary law and gender equality. 
The illustrations of custom I have discussed today come with substantial 
controversy. We may well legitimately disagree whether certain customs are 
even desirable. Open beach access through the property law doctrine of an 
inchoate public always having had such a customary right seems—at least to 
me (and Justice Scalia116)—a pretext or fiction for judges to declare their 
preference for public rights over private property and to deny any redress. 
Viewed with North American eyes and values, we might question whether the 
South African family law customs of brideprice and polygyny are truly 
atavistic and must be affirmatively suppressed to promote gender equality in 
that society. Even the structural constitutional proposition that the balance of 
power between the branches of the federal government can be modified, over 
time, by a consistent set of practices actually acquiesced in by the coordinate 
branches may sound like heresy to some. 
And, yet, despite these serious objections to these customs as a matter of 
public law design, they have persisted. Oregon’s common law doctrine of 
custom has not been found to be an unconstitutional judicial taking. Lobolo is 
still routinely being paid as a condition for contracting marriages in South 
Africa, and the institution of polygynous marriages is alive and well in that 
 
 114 Inland Waterways Corp. v. Young, 309 U.S. 517, 524 (1940). 
 115 S. Thascii Caecilii Cypriani, Epistola S. Cypriani ad Pompeium Contra Epistolam Stephani, in 3 
PATROLOGIAE CURSUS COMPLETUS 1174, 1182 (J.-P. Migne ed., 1844) (unofficial translation from Latin). 
 116 See Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 510 U.S. 1207, 1212–13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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country. U.S. courts, in making separation-of-powers determinations, will 
often have recourse to the historic practice of the political branches of the 
federal government and will validate such usages unless they are plainly 
contrary to the constitutional text or unsupported by the other branches. In each 
of these instances, a customary regime has stood its ground against a 
significant public law value and has managed to change it. 
According to legal theory orthodoxy as reflected in the writers mentioned 
here—Blackstone, Austin, Carter, Plucknett, and Hart—that is just not 
supposed to happen. But it has. Custom has managed to overcome its relatively 
weak status as a source of law. Custom has even been able to penetrate that 
great jurisprudential citadel of public law. Even constitutions, statutes, and 
administrative regulations are not immune from cross-reading and analysis in 
light of the usages and practices of relevant legal communities. 
And, irrespective of what we might think about the merits of the underlying 
practice that may be at issue in a controversy, I believe it is desirable that the 
public law can bow in the face of custom. As a matter of design for legal 
systems, custom—like the original conception of the judge-made common 
law—allows for flexibility or “play in the joints.” Bottom-up lawmaking may 
introduce some uncertainties into a legal system, and (on occasion) a serious 
lack of uniformity, but such can always be compensated for by further 
legislative action. In any event, custom as an expression of legal will by 
communities can play an important role in sustaining democratic and 
pluralistic values in a legal system. And while the public law is a repository for 
such values, it is often by the implementation of a community’s expectations 
through customary practices that they are truly, and lastingly, achieved. 
 
